In seeking to fulfill its mission, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) is dependent on the capabilities of its Member States. While flag States remain primarily responsible for ensuring compliance of their registered vessels with instruments adopted under that United Nations specialized agency's aegis, coastal States also play a competing but complementary role in the balance of jurisdiction over ships. In particular, the right to regulate the vessel's intent on visiting the port, or its presence therein, is often relied upon to account for the limitations of flag State enforcement. The capacity to act as a port State under international law is the basis for certain implementation mechanisms stemming from treaty provisions on port state control, as well as for innovative practices of port States, either collectively or individually. This chapter provides the reader with an overview of the role of port State jurisdiction in IMO law and practice, and the challenges that can arise in the complex relationship between port States and the IMO.
ABSTRACT: Denmark is among the more loyal European Union (EU) member states when it comes to national implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). However, even in Denmark several mechanisms contribute to sub-optimal implementation of the CFP. Looking at implementation problems for a relatively loyal member state, this chapter sheds critical light on national implementation of the CFP in the EU as a whole. The chapter initially provides a description of the institutional set-up for fisheries policy-making and implementation in Denmark, including a short historical account of the development of the Danish fisheries and their management since 1983. Subsequently, the chapter provides an understanding of the mechanisms and processes behind the Danish implementation of fisheries policy, arguing that these mechanisms and processes have led to a situation where the goals agreed at the EU level are supplemented or even replaced by national priorities. The chapter concludes that in order to capture the domestic politics associated with CFP implementation in Denmark, it is important to understand the policy process as a synergistic interaction between dominant interests, policy alliances/networks and prevailing discourses. The inability of the EU to ensure that the conservation goals agreed at the EU level are loyally pursued during national implementation is one of the reasons why the EU has been struggling to keep fishing mortality rates at a sustainable level.
The paper focuses on the impacts of the inclusion of the maritime sector in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). The enforcement of a regional Market-Based Measure (MBM) such as the EU ETS may provide financial incentives to shipping operators to reconfigure their networks and avoid voyages inside the European Economic Area (EEA). This paper investigates the risk of container vessels engaging in evasive port calls by replacing EEA transshipment hubs with nearby non-EEA competitors. We perform a cost-benefit analysis that calculates the cost of EU Allowances (EUAs) for several international services and compares it with a relocation scenario. Our case studies focus on the Piraeus-Izmir and the Algeciras-Tanger Med scenarios and identify the EU carbon price turning point that will render the switch of the transshipment hubs a cost-effective choice for the operator. The results show that the preference of a non-EEA hub will become attractive for carbon prices well below 25 EUR per metric ton of CO2. Further, in all cases, the hub switch results in a rise in the overall carbon emissions attributed to the service which amplifies the risk of carbon leakage. Our results show that the relocation would lead to revenue loss for the EU ETS and penalization of the EEA transshipment hubs in close proximity with hubs outside the EEA, thus posing a threat to their economic activity and development.
Maritime transport is the backbone of international trade. The amount of total international maritime trade in million tonnes loaded was 8408 in 2012 and had increased to 11.076 by 2019, for an average annual increase of 3.12%. In early 2020, the world fleet contained 98.140 ships of 100 gross tonnes and above with 2.06 million dead weight tonnage of capacity. The greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from shipping activities are not negligible. According to the fourth GHG study commissioned by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), in 2018, global shipping emitted a total of 1056 million tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2), accounting for around 2.89% of global anthropogenic CO2 emissions. Due to the international nature of shipping, efforts to control CO2 emissions from ships are absent from the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. In an attempt to phase out carbon emissions from shipping entirely, the IMO formulated a strategy to cut the total annual GHG emissions from shipping by at least 50% from their 2008 levels by 2050; however, no mandatory rules have been promulgated since the release of this strategy.
Given the insufficient progress made by the IMO, the European Union (EU) decided to take a leading role in promoting the reduction of CO2 emissions from maritime transport. In 2015, the EU issued regulations on the monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) of CO2 emissions from ships with a gross tonnage above 5000 arriving at, within, or departing from ports under the jurisdiction of an EU member state, to come into force at the beginning of 2018. It should be noted that, under the MRV regime, even if only one port on a voyage is within the European Economic Area (EEA) and the other is not (e.g., a voyage from Rotterdam directly to Singapore), the ship must still report the total CO2 emissions of the whole voyage, rather than just the emissions of the part of the voyage within EU waters.
The MRV regime has been in operation for over two years, and the CO2 emissions data for the 2018 and 2019 reporting periods have already been published. Based on the data collected, on 16 September 2020, the European Parliament took the bold step of voting for the inclusion of maritime transport in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). This is a market-based system that uses economic tools such as a levy on bunker fuels and an emission trading system to provide monetary incentives for polluters to reduce emissions. The European Commission is conducting an impact assessment of the ETS, the results of which are expected in 2021. At this time, it is unclear how the inclusion of shipping into the EU ETS will work. There are two possibilities. The first is that only intra-EU voyages will be included; that is, only voyages from one EEA port to another EEA port will have to pay CO2 emission costs. The second is that both intra-EU voyages and voyages between an EEA port and a non-EEA port will have to pay CO2 emission costs, with the cost of a voyage between an EEA port and a non-EEA port being based on the CO2 emissions over the whole voyage, rather than the part of the voyage within EU waters. As the second possibility also covers the first possibility, we examine the implications of both possibilities but focus more on the second.
The International Ballast Water Management (BWM) Convention entered into force in September 2017. In the convention, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) required two options: ballast water exchange (BWE) standard D-1, and ballast water performance standard D-2 which required ballast water treatment systems (BWTSs). We explored the impact of policy on the utilization of BWTSs by examining IMO Type Approval records and country-level databases in the United States and Australia. In December 2018, 65 BWTSs had IMO Type Approval and 13 had US Coast Guard approval. The majority of vessels with BWTSs had either electrolytic or UV treatment systems (Australia, 84%; USA, 89%). From 2016 to 2017, both countries experienced an increase in the percentage of vessels with BWTS, vessels utilizing BWTS, and total ballast discharge treated with BWTS. Based on this analysis, shipowners appear to primarily rely on two treatment technologies in Australia and the United States to meet compliance.
This book introduces a novel model to explain how the co-design and co-delivery of ocean science knowledge and solutions is influenced by ocean stakeholders with asymmetric power and resources, policy incentives and ocean conflict, ocean narratives, different knowledge systems, security concerns, principles, formal and informal rules, and communication competencies. Using the International Collaboration in Ocean Science model as a basis, the book advances with three lines of inquiry: ontological security of ocean science participants, the Ocean Decade and human well-being, and strategic narratives about international collaboration in ocean science. Through these, Carolijn van Noort shows the enabling and constraining conditions of co-creating ocean knowledge and solutions. Theoretically novel, the book provides a compelling framework for scholars to study ocean science collaboration.
This article aims to present the most relevant practices of offshore oil contracting at an international level, in order to better understand the legal dynamics of the sector. The problem investigated deals with the terms of the legal relationship between the State and national and foreign public companies, as well as the relationship between States, with a view to the exploitation of shared offshore oil resources. This problem is current, taking into account both the fact that oil is a scarce resource, as well as the fact that its offshore exploration is particularly complex and risky. This article presents, in a non-exhaustive way, some examples of practices that illustrate contractual trends that have already crystallized. The approach to its content is made from an international law perspective, focused on the transnational challenges posed to States and operators. It is concluded that the sector is characterized by a huge variety of practices, which reveals an ability of operators to adapt to the characteristics of the concrete challenges of an offshore exploration project. It also shows the political and economic particularities of the States involved in the process.
This introductory note examines the development at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for the year 2020. While there was no judgment in 2020, proceedings of two cases, the M/T “San Padre Pio” (No. 2) Case (Switzerland/Nigeria) and the Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Mauritius and Maldives in the Indian Ocean (Mauritius/Maldives), continue. Accordingly, this note discusses the issues of the two pending cases. Furthermore, there were some important events regarding the Tribunal in 2020. Among other things, this note focuses on an adoption of a Model Agreement between ITLOS and Singapore, the election of the seven members of the Tribunal, and amendments of the Rules of the Tribunal.
The ‘port managing body (PMB)’ plays a central role in the development of the port. Public funding for investment projects of the port managing bodies is common in the EU as well as most other countries. This paper adds to the body of knowledge on port investments and financing challenges with an analysis of data from two surveys that were carried in 2018 and 2023. This analysis yields the following conclusions. First, the PMBs in the EU have shifted their investments, in response to changing investment drivers. The increasing relevance of the transition to a net-zero economy leads to a shift towards investments in projects that reduce environmental effects and/or allow private investments in new green activities such as the production of zero-emission fuels. Second, financial bottlenecks are the most important bottlenecks for the execution of the projects of PMBs. Third, the PMBs have high aspirations with regard to public funding, both on the EU and national level. Fourth, there is a difference between two types of PMBs: state-owned commercial port development companies and the public sector embedded port authorities; the latter execute less projects without public funding and are more oriented on national public funding than on EU funding. Finally, the societal value creation of the investments of PMBs is used to justify public funding aspirations. The PMBs indicate that the majority of their investments create societal value, often by enabling emission reductions and by reduced local negative externalities.
The 0.1% sulphur limit within Sulphur Emission Control Areas (SECA) has made compulsory the use of either pricier ultra-low sulphur fuel, or the installation of abatement technologies that require significant capital investments. Due to the unexpectedly low fuel prices, Ro-Ro operators have been able to cope with the new sulphur limits, but recent research has shown that if fuel prices increase some Ro-Ro services may face the risk of closure. This paper proposes three key performance indicators (KPIs) to enable the asssessment of the impact of SECAs on Ro-Ro shipping. The KPIs are used on a set of case studies for services of a leading European Ro-Ro operator, and allow benchmarking of a series of operational and policy measures that aim to reverse the negative impacts of SECAs. The operational measures consider speed reduction, new sailing frequency, fleet reconfiguration, as well as investments in abatement technologies. Policy measures include the options of either subsidizing shippers or ship operators, or alternatively introducing new taxes on landbased options. The KPIs can be useful to ship operators seeking to improve the resilience of their network, as well as to regulatory bodies designing new environmental policies and understanding any negative implications these may have on ship operators.