Irregular migration by sea leads states such as Italy and Australia to conduct maritime rescue operations involving refugees and other migrants. During these operations, states must deal with the question of where to disembark survivors. The law of the sea regime obliges states to ensure survivors are delivered to a 'place of safety', arguably requiring maritime officers to merely consider the physical safety of survivors immediately on disembarkation. Non-binding International Maritime Organization guidelines state that the need to avoid disembarking refugees and asylum-seekers in the states of departure or origin is also a consideration. The guidelines refer to other 'relevant' international law, including treaties dealing with 'refugee refoulement' or refoulement in connection with a risk of torture. Under the international human rights law regime, including international refugee law, states' obligations in relation to non-refoulement are broader and prohibit the return of refugees and migrants to states where they directly or indirectly face persecution, torture or other serious harm. In interpreting 'place of safety', this work argues that there is insufficient consensus to integrate the two legal regimes. Nevertheless, states can be under co-existing human rights obligations that place limits on the disembarkation of rescued refugees and migrants.
This study examines how the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) has contributed to the ‘progressive development’ of general international law relevant to regulating rescue and disembarkation of refugees and migrants found at sea. It explores the ILC’s texts on interpretation and implementation of international obligations, state responsibility, fragmentation and harmonization of international law, and the status of certain principles of general international law, including jus cogens general principles of law and the principle of good faith, which present legal parameters for regulation of maritime search and rescue operations. In conducting doctrinal examinations of international law and gathering evidence of the practice of States and other relevant actors, the ILC contributes by analysing, clarifying, and systemising important topics of general international law. However, state implementation frequently falls short of the legal interpretations of the ILC, particularly as they relate to respect for and protection of human rights at sea. Therefore, while the ILC needs new strategies to directly connect with States and international organisations, it remains reliant on the mutual following of national and international courts and tribunals, and its mutual contribution in scholarship.
Subsea power cables are crucial for transmitting electrical power between offshore installations, islands, and onshore infrastructure. The demand for these cables has surged with the expansion of offshore wind farms. Despite mechanisation, divers are still needed for tasks such as installation, inspection, and remedial work, facing hazards like entanglement, equipment damage, and those to the environment. Therefore, analyzing accidents in diving operations during subsea cable installation is essential to develop safety measures that protect divers and ensure successful installations. This document reports an analysis of the hazards and accident events linked to diving operations during subsea cable installation. Few risk assessments of these operations have been made publicly available.
Various methods can be used to analyze diving accidents, but this document reports on the use of the Accident Anatomy (AA) method. The AA method combines fault trees and cause-consequence diagrams to map accident causes and consequences. In the AA method, evidence-based (post-accident) analysis is used jointly with predictive analysis to identify deviations from normal conditions that could lead to accidents.
To exhaust the identification of hazards, the AA method is additionally powered by an error mode classification checklist, which classifies errors that produce similar effects on a system. Analysts used this checklist to identify hazards for each basic diving operation task identified.
As a data source, 163 documents were analyzed, including accident records, regulations, manuals, and scientific papers. Basic tasks associated with diving operations are identified, along with hazards for each task. Predictive analysis identifies potential events and unwanted consequences when normal conditions (specified in safety procedures and specifications) deviate. The unwanted consequences that were found include delays, technical problems, injuries, and fatalities. Ultimately, safety measures are identified for each basic task to reduce the effects of hazards.
This is an informational document that communicates the account of SDU participants of the MISSION project on how to prove whether the system being developed by the consortium improves the safety of ships in the port areas.
The methods suggested in this document are based on an overview of the state-of-practice guidelines and state-of-the-art methods in safety risk analysis. They are compliant with the Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) and The Ship Inspection Report Programme (SIRE).
Other accounts on the same issues may exist that are either complementary or preferred over the methods described in this paper. This document is intended to make discussions constructive by possibly benchmarking other views with those described here and by working out a clear methodology and guidelines for conducting a safety risk analysis of the system being developed; and for informing decisions on the system’s acceptability or improvements needed to achieve the acceptability.
Ship grounding experiments are important benchmarks used to validate numerical analysis, analytical and empirical formulation. They are key to the understanding of damage mechanism. A set of small-scale ship model grounding tests over a sharp rock are conducted in a water tank considering the influence of surrounding water. Two damage modes are observed in the grounding tests, Mode I for discontinuous fracture/tear and Mode II for continuous fracture/tear. The horizontal grounding resistance forces, damage extents of ship bottom plates, and ship motions are recorded and discussed in detail. Moreover, the energy dissipation process of ship model during grounding process is analyzed based on the test results. The influence of the initial velocity, the initial relative height between the upper surface of the horizontal ship bottom plate and the rock tip, and the rock eccentricity on the ship motion response and structural damage are studied.
A conceptual design framework for collision and grounding analysis is proposed to evaluate the crashworthiness of double-hull structures. This work attempts to simplify the input parameters needed for the analysis, which can be considered as a step towards a design-oriented procedure against collision and grounding. Four typical collision and grounding scenarios are considered: (1) side structure struck by a bulbous bow, (2) side structure struck by a straight bow, (3) bottom raking, (4) bottom stranding. The analyses of these scenarios are based on statistical data of striking ship dimensions, velocities, collision angles and locations, as well as seabed shapes and sizes, grounding depth and location. The evaluation of the damage extent considers the 50- and 90-percentile values from the statistics of collision and grounding accidents. The external dynamics and internal mechanics are combined to analyse systematically the ship structural damage and energy absorption under accidental loadings.
The DNV Nordic Maritime Universities Workshop is organized as a collaboration between DNV and universities in the Nordic region with a maritime related education or research line. The workshop covers all research topics related to naval architecture, maritime engineering and maritime transport, including safety, energy efficiency and environmental performance, environmental pressures, new technologies and digitalization. The 25th Nordic Maritime Universities Workshop was held on 30-31 January 2025 at the Technical University of Denmark (DTU), Lyngby Campus. The workshop has been organized and hosted by the Maritime Group at the Department of Civil and Mechanical Engineering (DTU Construct). In total we received 77 abstracts from 7 countries. This includes 23 abstracts from Denmark, 23 from Sweden, 16 from Norway, 10 from Germany, 3 from Finland, 1 from The Netherlands, and 1 from Poland. The presentation of the abstracts and the talks is carried out over two days of the workshop and in 10 sessions, distributed over 7 topics:
• Maritime Safety & Risk Reduction (17 talks)
• Structures & Ship Design (8 talks)
• Numerical Methods & Marine Hydrodynamics (14 talks)
• Ship Operations & Navigation (14 talks)
• Autonomous Shipping & Digitalization (8 talks)
• Alternative Marine Fuels (8 talks)
• Wind Assisted & Alternative Propulsion (8 talks)
This year a special issue has been initiated in International Shipbuilding Progress to commemorate the 25th Nordic Maritime Universities Workshop. All abstract presenters have been invited to submit a full paper, to be considered for publication in this journal after a peer-review process. This compendium includes the workshop program, the session details and the 77 abstracts arranged in alphabetical order.
In recent years, shipboard microgrids (MGs) have become more flexible, efficient, and reliable. The next generations of future shipboards are required to be equipped with more focuses on energy storage systems to provide all-electric shipboards. Therefore, the shipboards must be very reliable to ensure the operation of all parts of the system. A reliable shipboard MG should be pro-tected from system faults through protection selectivity to minimize the impact of faults and facili-tate detection and location of faulty zones with the highest accuracy and speed. It is necessary to have an across-the-board overview of the protection systems in DC shipboards. This paper provides a comprehensive review of the issues and challenges faced in the protection of shipboard MGs. Furthermore, given the different types of components utilized in shipboard MGs, the fault behavior analysis of these components is provided to highlight the requirements for their protection. The protection system of DC shipboards is divided into three sub-systems, namely, fault detection, lo-cation, and isolation. Therefore, a comprehensive comparison of different existing fault detection, location, and isolation schemes, from traditional to modern techniques, on shipboard MGs is presented to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of each scheme.
The content of Resolution MSC.473(ES.2) can be summarized in five main points and one invitation to IMO Member States.
The first point pertains to the implementation of the Framework of Protocols. The second point pertains to the designation of seafarers as 'key workers' in order to facilitate safe and unhindered movement for embarking or disembarking a vessel. The third point pertains to the consideration of temporary migration measures to ease mobility of seafarers, eg waivers or relaxations of visa or documentary requirements. The fourth point is on the use of prevention measures such as testing crews before embarkation; this requires active conduct by port states, namely providing access to personal protective equipment and testing facilities. The fifth point is on providing seafarers with immediate access to medical care and facilities, as well as with evacuation when the assistance required cannot be provided on board or at port; this aims to prevent humanitarian situations such as casualties on board vessels due to lack of access to intensive care units.
Furthermore, the Resolution invites Member States to designate a National Focal Point on Crew Change and Repatriation of Seafarers ('National Focal Point').
A serious ship-bridge collision accident happens about once a year. These accidents cause fatalities and large economic losses due to loss of transportation service and replacement cost of the bridge structure. One of the most recent, widely published, ship-bridge collisions was the collision where the containership Dali in 2024 collided with the Baltimore Key Bridge in the US city of Baltimore. The resulting collapse of the bridge girder caused six fatalities as well as large financial losses. One effect of this event has been that engineers around the world now are being engaged in evaluation of the vulnerability of existing bridges and establishment of rational design criteria for new bridges.
The presentation will outline elements of a rational design procedure for bridge structures against ship collision impacts. A set of risk acceptance criteria will be proposed and a mathematically based procedure for calculation of the probability of ship collision accidents caused by human as well as technical errors will be presented. This first part of the presentation leads to identification of the largest striking ship, “design vessel”, a given bridge element must withstand without structural failure in order for the bridge connection to fulfil the risk acceptance criteria.
The final part of the presentation will be devoted to an analysis of the needed impact capacity for the bridge pylons and piers exposed to ship bow impact loads from design vessels. A procedure will be described for derivation of expressions for ship bow crushing forces, which can be used in design against ship collision impacts. The resulting collision force expressions are verified by comparison with large-scale laboratory experiments and an analysis of a fullscale shipping accident. Finally, the proposed impact force expressions will be compared with existing standards for modelling ship collisions against bridges as published by AASHTO, IABSE and Eurocode.