The agenda of objectual International Relations has shown why object matters, how they arise and with what effects. Far less attention has been paid to how objects are maintained and stabilized over time and how their coherence is achieved. To add this dimension to the debate, we suggest turning to the infrastructures of object maintenance. Infrastructures are social material arrangements that maintain objects and enable their use. We introduce a framework for the study of object infrastructures and illustrate it by drawing on the case of "maritime piracy". Providing a historical reconstruction of the infrastructures that produce piracy as an international object, we show that the growing proliferation of these infrastructures does not lead to an internal coherence of the object over time, but rather objectual fracturing and instability. We reveal how objects are often multiple rather than unitary. The article adds an important new dimension to the study of objects in International Relations.
The success of the Seychelles Coast Guard shows how regional states, however tiny, can play an outsized role not only in countering piracy but also in maritime security in general. By taking quick and sharp action against malicious actors, small states can make a major contribution to regional maritime security. To stop the ominous return of piracy and address other maritime crimes like illegal fishing, smuggling, and pollution crimes across the world’s oceans, the contributions of small states will be crucial. Drawing on the Seychelles example, small states should overcome the sea blindness that pervades in many governments, recognize the sustainable development benefits from the blue economy, and understand security at sea as a political priority, while making efficient use of external security assistance.
The European Union (EU) seeks to become a global maritime-security actor, yet strategic challenges influence its maritime-security strategy process. Is there a distinctive and coherent EU approach to global maritime security, and how should the EU address the growing range of maritime challenges, including the intensification of militarized competition in the Indo-Pacific?
Offshore wind energy production has seen a significant expansion in recent years. With technologies rapidly improving and prices dropping, it is now one of the key instruments in the green energy transition. The implications of offshore wind farm expansion for maritime security and ocean governance have, so far, received sparse attention in the literature. This article offers one of the first thorough analyses of the security of offshore wind farms and related installations, such as underwater electricity cables, energy islands, and hydrogen plants. The technical vulnerabilities of wind farm systems is reviewed and threats from terrorism, crime and State hostilities, including physical and cyber risk scenarios, are discussed. The expansion of green offshore energy production must keep pace with the changing threat landscape that follows from it. Prospective solutions for the protection of wind farms systems, including surveillance, patrols and self-protection are discussed. The current repertoire of maritime security solutions is in many ways capable of dealing with the threats and risks effectively if adjusted accordingly. The analysis builds important new bridges between debates in energy security and maritime security, as well as the implications of climate change adaption and mitigation for security at sea.
Offshore wind energy production has seen a significant expansion in the past decade and has become one of the most important maritime activities. However, the implications of offshore wind farm expansion for maritime security have, so far, received sparse attention in the literature. In this article we conduct one of the first thorough analyses of the security of offshore wind farms and related installations, such as underwater electricity cables, energy islands, and hydrogen plants.
The protection of critical maritime infrastructures has become a top political priority, since the September 2022 attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea. This contribution reveals why the protection of infrastructures at sea is a difficult task. Reviewing the spectrum of maritime infrastructures (transport, energy, data, fishing, ecosystems) and the potential threats to them (accidents, terrorism, blue crime, grey zone tactics) demonstrates that designating infrastructures as critical and worthy of special protection measures is a political choice. The analysis moreover shows the need of protective instruments that are tailored to the specificities of maritime space, and the need for integrating diverse policy fields, including defense, diplomacy, marine safety, maritime security and cyber security. Cooperation with the infrastructure industry, enhanced surveillance and investments in repair capacities are also required.
While systematic literature reviews (SLRs) have contributed substantially to developing knowledge in fields such as medicine, they have made limited contributions to developing knowledge in the supply chain management domain. This is due to the ontological and epistemological idiosyncrasies of research in supply chain management, which need to be accounted for when retrieving, selecting, and synthesizing studies in an SLR. Therefore, we propose a new paradigm for SLRs in the supply chain domain that is based on both best practice and the unique attributes of doing supply chain management research. This approach involves exploring existing studies with attention to theoretical boundaries, units of analysis, sources of data, study contexts, definitions and the operationalization of constructs, as well as research methods, with the goal of refining or revising existing theory. This new paradigm will push supply chain management research to the frontier of current methodological standards and build a foundation for improving the contribution of future SLRs in the supply chain and adjacent management disciplines.
1. Introduction. 2. Industry self-regulation in maritime law. 2.1. Why is industry self-regulation necessary? 2.2. Relevant self-regulatory instru- ments. 3. Industry self-regulation and armed protection. 3.1. Quality assurance of private Maritime Security Companies. 3.2. Use of force. 3.3. Reporting. 4. Remarks and conclusion
This chapter examines the role of industry self-regulation in relation to international maritime law. While multilateral intergovernmental agreements are important to encouraging regulatory harmonisation, private actors have an essential role in industry, both in developing norms and in making rules and standards effective to ensure safe and secure shipping on clean oceans. Nonetheless, private actors are often overlooked and yet to be placed in the context of international maritime law and especially the United Nations Convention of Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This chapter does so by analysing industry self-regulation in relation to UNCLOS, flag states and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) respectively.