Critical maritime infrastructure protection has become a priority in ocean governance, particularly in Europe. Increased geopolitical tensions, regional conflicts, and the Nord Stream pipeline attacks in the Baltic Sea of September 2022 have been the main catalysts for this development. Calls for enhancing critical maritime infrastructure protection have multiplied, yet, what this implies in practice is less clear. This is partially a question of engineering and risk analysis. It also concerns how the multitude of actors involved can act concertedly. Dialogue, information sharing, and coordination are required, but there is a lack of discussion about which institutional set ups would lend themselves. In this article, we argue that the maritime counter-piracy operations off Somalia, as well as maritime cybersecurity governance hold valuable lessons to provide new answers for the institutional question in the critical maritime infrastructure protection agenda. We start by clarifying what is at stake in the CMIP agenda and why it is a major contemporary governance challenge. We then examine and assess the instruments found in maritime counter-piracy and maritime cybersecurity governance, including why and how they provide effective solutions for enhancing critical maritime infrastructure protection. Finally, we assess the ongoing institution building for CMIP in Europe. While we focus on the European experience, our discussion on designing institutions carries forward lessons for CMIP in other regions, too.
Cyber-resilience is an increasing concern for autonomous navigation of marine vessels. This paper scrutinizes cyber-resilience properties of marine navigation through a prism with three edges: multiple sensor information fusion, diagnosis of not-normal behaviours, and change detection. It proposes a two-stage estimator for diagnosis and mitigation of sensor signals used for coastal navigation. Developing a Likelihood Field approach, the first stage extracts shoreline features from radar and matches them to the electronic navigation chart. The second stage associates buoy and beacon features from the radar with chart information. Using real data logged at sea tests combined with simulated spoofing, the paper verifies the ability to timely diagnose and isolate an attempt to compromise position measurements. A new approach is suggested for high level processing of received data to evaluate their consistency, which is agnostic to the underlying technology of the individual sensory input. A combined generalized likelihood ratio test using both parametric Gaussian modelling and Kernel Density Estimation is suggested and compared with a detector using only either of two. The paper shows how the detection of deviations from nominal behaviour is possible when the navigation sensor is under attack or defects occur.
The cybersecurity landscape is evolving, driven by a reinforcing feedback loop of increasingly sophisticated attacks and defences. Threat actors, long benefitting from the asymmetrical “attacker’s advantage” of focused targeting, have now matured their organizational structures to facilitate tactical information sharing, technique specialization, the establishment of markets for buying and selling exploit and vulnerability information, and providing training on how to circumvent detection and defence systems.