This article discusses the role of private regulators within the international legal framework of Arctic shipping. The role of private actors has been acknowledged both in legal scholarship and policy papers; but it has not yet been placed in the centre of attention. This article does so by analysing the role of private actors under the Polar Code and three types of private regulation — guidelines of classification societies, requirements of insurance industry and private contracting. It concludes that private actors have an essential role both in developing and effectuation of public international law and thus in achieving sustainable Arctic shipping.
The accelerated melting of the Arctic ice leads to the navigation of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) linking Asia and Europe, shortening transport channel between China and the European Union (EU). This has a significant impact on the China-EU bilateral trade which is analyzed in the present study. We present a framework based on a general equilibrium model for analyzing the impact of the NSR on the trade and the economies of China and the EU. Different fuel cost scenarios, consisting of fuel prices and sailing speeds on ice, are also considered. Specifically, we measure the changes in shipping costs between China and the EU, brought about by NSR navigation. These are used as a basis to quantify changes in transport technology. The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model is used to predict the trade and economic impacts. The results show that the NSR can save 0.98% in shipping costs and generate an increase in the exports of China and the EU in the order of 14,986 and 8,228 million US dollars, respectively. Among these exports, the mining industry shows the fastest growth, while the electronics industry experiences the largest increase in trade volume. Our findings reveal the potential of the NSR as an alternative route and its positive impact on bilateral trade between China and the EU. The results can provide a basis for shipping companies and governments to make decisions regarding the use of Arctic routes.
ABSTRACT: Climate change provides for improved conditions for maritime navigation and results in increased activity in the Arctic. Those increased activities influence the safety at sea and risk of accidents. A disaster as the Costa Concordia incident would have far more serious consequences in Greenlandic waters than it had in Italy, therefore the question of prevention and disaster-preparedness is crucial. One approach to avoid risks is to create specific legislation. The legal system guiding safe navigation of cruise ships in/around Greenlandic waters is complex: the legal regime for navigation is set in different general and specific international, regional and national legal acts, partly non-binding, therefore issues of effectiveness arise. Safety is also influenced by practical issues, e.g. the lack of sufficient nautical charts for Greenlandic waters and “preparedness” at land to handle potential disasters, such as the SAR-system and preparedness of different actors, for example hospitals.
This article reviews and examines the most significant climate-change-related impacts and adaptation from the perspective of stakeholders in Greenlandic fisheries. The study was constructed as a comprehensive, multi-site, bottom-up case study around Greenlandic fisheries (south-north/offshore-inshore), where interviews and workshops with Greenlandic fishermen and stakeholders have communicated their observations of fishery changes associated with changes in the marine environment within the last decade. Key observations include: changes in sea ice cover; increased abundance of known species in North Greenland; fish species relocation and periodic absences in coastal systems; a northward movement of the shrimp fishery; new and unprecedented bycatch issues; and new fisheries. Stakeholder knowledge acknowledges the capacity of both offshore and coastal fisheries to adapt to changing seasonality and distribution. Factory capacity and decision-making as well as bycatch legislation have been identified as the most critical bottlenecks for (re)diversifying fisheries and increasing the value of the locally available resources.
The latest IPCC report on Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, which builds upon previous IPCC's reports, established a causal link between anthropogenic impacts and ocean acidification, by noting a significant decrease in the Ocean's uptake of CO2, with consequent damage to Earth's ecosystems, which in turn has traceable repercussions on the Arctic Ocean and then from the Arctic to the Planet Earth. The impact of ocean acidification is not only in the biological ecosystem but also on human activities, such as livelihood, food security, socio-economic security and developing communities. However, who can possibly be held ethically/legally responsible for ocean acidification from a climate justice perspective? Since what happens in the Arctic does not stay there, a more systematic law and policy approach to study options and responses in a multi-level, climate-ethical, global perceptive is needed. This paper sheds light on the legal responses available at global, regional and national levels to ocean acidification in a law of the sea and ocean context, both in the Arctic and from the Arctic. The gaps in legal and policy responses in connection to the ethical climate component will be identified. It will shed light on the planetary limits that humanity needs to stay within in order to maintain the future of the Earth. Since it touches upon questions of legal responsibility, on who is responsible for ocean acidification, it will connect to the “supply side” of fossil fuels production and global extraction projects causing anthropogenic CO2 emissions, one of the major causes of ocean acidification. It will also identify which actors, be they "officials" or "non-officials" (such as international organizations, states, regional institutes, Arctic citizens or even forums) should be held ethically responsible, and who should take action.
The impact of climate change in the Arctic Ocean such as ice melting and ice retreat facilitates natural resources extraction. Arctic fossil fuel becomes the drivers of geopolitical changes in the Arctic Ocean. Climate change facilitates natural resource extractions and increases competition between states and can result in tensions, even military ones. This article investigates through a political and legal analysis the role of China as an emerging regulatory sea power in the Arctic Ocean given its assertive “energy hungry country behaviour” in the Arctic Ocean. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Arctic Council (AC) are taken into consideration under climate change effects, to assess how global legal frameworks and institutions can deal with China’s strategy in the Arctic Ocean. China’s is moving away from its role as “humble power” to one of “informal imperialistic” resulting in substantial impact on the Arctic and Antartic dynamism. Due to ice-melting, an easy access to natural resources, China’s Arctic strategy in the Arctic Ocean has reinforced its military martitime strategy and has profoundly changed its maritime military doctrine shifting from regional to global in the context of UNCLOS. In particular, it is wondered, what China understands about the public order dimension of UNCLOS. The article concludes that despite China’ assertive behaviour towards the Arctic environmental ocean and its rise as global sea power, for the time being, China cannot be considered as a variable for Arctic security as there are no sufficient legal and policy objective elements to adduct that it constitutes a threat to Artic ocean security.
This article explores how adopting a combined ecosystem and justice approach to deep-sea mining (DSM)-particularly in vulnerable regions like the Arctic-would constitute a paradigm shift in ocean environmental law and governance. Such a shift would move ocean governance beyond fragmented, technocratic, and resource-driven frameworks toward an integrated, equitable, and sustainability-centered regime grounded in ecological integrity, social justice, and respect for human rights and local traditions.
The BBNJ Agreement will affect legal frameworks for the conservation of marine biological diversity in various regions of the world ocean and the marine Arctic is no exception. As biological diversity in the marine Arctic is particularly vulnerable, the implications of the BBNJ Agreement for the conservation of biological diversity in the marine Arctic deserves serious consideration. Of particular note is the procedure for an environmental impact assessment (EIA). Given that damage to the environment may be irreversible, it is a prerequisite to conduct an EIA before authorizing planned activities, with a view to preventing environmental harm. An EIA constitutes a crucial element in the conservation of the marine environment, including biological diversity. Hence, this article examines the potential implications of the procedure for an EIA as set out under the BBNJ Agreement for the conservation of biological diversity in the marine Arctic beyond national jurisdiction.
The existence of a sense of common or community interests is a prerequisite to establishing an order in a society, national or international. In this connection, it is notable that the protection of community interests is increasingly important in international law and the law of the sea is no exception. The increasing need for protecting community interests necessitates a new paradigm in the law of the sea. The legal issues regarding the marine Arctic should also be considered in the context of changing paradigms in the law of the sea. Thus this article seeks to overview principal issues of the international law governing the marine Arctic from the viewpoints of a dual paradigm, that is, the law of divided oceans (paradigm I) and the law of our common ocean (paradigm II).
This paper presents a detailed BC, NOx and SO2 emission inventory for ships in the Arctic in 2012 based on satellite AIS data, ship engine power functions and technology stratified emission factors. Emission projections are presented for the years 2020, 2030 and 2050. Furthermore, the BC, SO2 and O3 concentrations and the deposition of BC are calculated for 2012 and for two arctic shipping scenarios – with or without arctic diversion routes due to a possible polar sea ice extent in the future.
In 2012, the largest shares of Arctic ships emissions are calculated for fishing ships (45% for BC, 38% for NOx, 23% for SO2) followed by passenger ships (20%, 17%, 25%), tankers (9%, 13%, 15%), general cargo (8%, 11%, 12%) and container ships (5%, 7%, 8%). In 2050, without arctic diversion routes, the total emissions of BC, NOx and SO2 are expected to change by +16%, −32% and −63%, respectively, compared to 2012. The results for fishing ships are the least certain, caused by a less precise engine power – sailing speed relation.
The calculated BC, SO2, and O3 surface concentrations and BC deposition contributions from ships are low as a mean for the whole Arctic in 2012, but locally BC additional contributions reach up to 20% around Iceland, and high additional contributions (100–300%) are calculated in some sea areas for SO2. In 2050, the arctic diversion routes highly influence the calculated surface concentrations and the deposition of BC in the Arctic. During summertime navigation contributions become very visible for BC (>80%) and SO2 (>1000%) along the arctic diversion routes, while the O3 (>10%) and BC deposition (>5%) additional contributions, respectively, get highest over the ocean east of Greenland and in the High Arctic.
The geospatial ship type specific emission results presented in this paper have increased the accuracy of the emission inventories for ships in the Arctic. The methodology can be used to estimate shipping emissions in other regions of the world, and hence may serve as an input for other researchers and policy makers working in this field.