Long considered a cultural contact zone, the Mediterranean has become a weaponised border zone keeping refugees from Africa and the MiddleEast away from ‘Fortress Europe’. The Mediterranean has become excessively dangerous to cross, leading many commentators to call this maritime space a ‘massive graveyard’. The widespread indifference and enmity towards migrants in Europe is, amongst other things, countered by documentary and commemorative projects by artists drawing attention to the suffering of drowned refugees. In this paper, I zoom in on documentary and memorial artistic projects by Mimmo Paladino, Jason deCaires Taylor, Christoph Büchel, Ai Weiwei and Đỉnh Q. Lê. In the frequent absence of dead bodies and specific grave sites on the ‘high seas’, they make claims regarding the humanity, singularity and memorability of the human lives of refugees drowned at sea. Based on a description of the artworks and their public, I make two interlinked theoretical arguments. First, the commemorative materialisations by contemporary artists are temporal claims to constitute the cultural heritage of the future. Second, given the sea’s aquatic materiality, the commemorative claims of these art projects require that commemorative materialisations must spatially move from the flux of the sea to the fixity of the land.
Satellite imagery has become a fundamental part for maritime monitoring and safety. Correctly estimating a ship's identity is a vital tool. We present a method based on facial recognition for identifying ships in satellite images. A large ship dataset is constructed from Sentinel-2 multispectral images and annotated by matching to the Automatic Identification System. Our dataset contains 7.000 unique ships, for which a total of 16.000 images are acquired. The method uses a convolutional neural network to extract a feature vector from the ship images and embed it on a hypersphere. Distances between ships can then be calculated via the embedding vectors. The network is trained using a triplet loss function, such that minimum distances are achieved for identical ships and maximum distances to different ships. Comparing a ship image to a reference set of ship images yields a set of distances. Ranking the distances provides a list of the most similar ships. The method correctly identifies a ship on average 60 % of the time as the first in the list. Larger ships are easier to identify than small ships, where the image resolution is a limitation.
ABSTRACT: Climate change provides for improved conditions for maritime navigation and results in increased activity in the Arctic. Those increased activities influence the safety at sea and risk of accidents. A disaster as the Costa Concordia incident would have far more serious consequences in Greenlandic waters than it had in Italy, therefore the question of prevention and disaster-preparedness is crucial. One approach to avoid risks is to create specific legislation. The legal system guiding safe navigation of cruise ships in/around Greenlandic waters is complex: the legal regime for navigation is set in different general and specific international, regional and national legal acts, partly non-binding, therefore issues of effectiveness arise. Safety is also influenced by practical issues, e.g. the lack of sufficient nautical charts for Greenlandic waters and “preparedness” at land to handle potential disasters, such as the SAR-system and preparedness of different actors, for example hospitals.
The impact of climate change in the Arctic Ocean such as ice melting and ice retreat facilitates natural resources extraction. Arctic fossil fuel becomes the drivers of geopolitical changes in the Arctic Ocean. Climate change facilitates natural resource extractions and increases competition between states and can result in tensions, even military ones. This article investigates through a political and legal analysis the role of China as an emerging regulatory sea power in the Arctic Ocean given its assertive “energy hungry country behaviour” in the Arctic Ocean. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Arctic Council (AC) are taken into consideration under climate change effects, to assess how global legal frameworks and institutions can deal with China’s strategy in the Arctic Ocean. China’s is moving away from its role as “humble power” to one of “informal imperialistic” resulting in substantial impact on the Arctic and Antartic dynamism. Due to ice-melting, an easy access to natural resources, China’s Arctic strategy in the Arctic Ocean has reinforced its military martitime strategy and has profoundly changed its maritime military doctrine shifting from regional to global in the context of UNCLOS. In particular, it is wondered, what China understands about the public order dimension of UNCLOS. The article concludes that despite China’ assertive behaviour towards the Arctic environmental ocean and its rise as global sea power, for the time being, China cannot be considered as a variable for Arctic security as there are no sufficient legal and policy objective elements to adduct that it constitutes a threat to Artic ocean security.
Recent advances, especially in deep learning, allow to effectively detect ship targets in surveillance videos. However, the translation of these detections to the real-world locations of ships has not been sufficiently explored. The common approach in the literature is using a transformation matrix to convert a pixel to a real-world coordinate. However, this approach has three shortcomings: first, a set of reference point pairs has to be manually prepared to establish the matrix; second, the matrix always maps a pixel to the same real-world coordinate, ignoring that there is no one-to-one correspondence between discrete pixel coordinates and continuous real-world coordinates; third, this approach can only work with one camera. In light of this, we propose a technique PixelToRegion that explicitly takes into account the uncertainty in coordinate conversion by mapping each pixel to a spatial polygon. Next, we propose a new algorithm MCbSLE that can estimate ship locations using pixel sets from multiple cameras. The precision of location estimation by MCbSLE is enhanced through spatial intersection between polygons from different cameras. Experiments are conducted under 16 carefully designed multi-camera settings to evaluate MCbSLE wrt four factors: different ports, the number of cameras, the distance between cameras, and camera headings. Results on one-day ship trajectory data show that (1) an 79.8% accuracy in the number of coordinates can be achieved by MCbSLE when there are no more than 10 ships in camera views; (2) using multiple cameras can improve the precision of location estimation by one order of magnitude compared with using one camera.
Critical maritime infrastructure protection has become a priority in ocean governance, particularly in Europe. Increased geopolitical tensions, regional conflicts, and the Nord Stream pipeline attacks in the Baltic Sea of September 2022 have been the main catalysts for this development. Calls for enhancing critical maritime infrastructure protection have multiplied, yet, what this implies in practice is less clear. This is partially a question of engineering and risk analysis. It also concerns how the multitude of actors involved can act concertedly. Dialogue, information sharing, and coordination are required, but there is a lack of discussion about which institutional set ups would lend themselves. In this article, we argue that the maritime counter-piracy operations off Somalia, as well as maritime cybersecurity governance hold valuable lessons to provide new answers for the institutional question in the critical maritime infrastructure protection agenda. We start by clarifying what is at stake in the CMIP agenda and why it is a major contemporary governance challenge. We then examine and assess the instruments found in maritime counter-piracy and maritime cybersecurity governance, including why and how they provide effective solutions for enhancing critical maritime infrastructure protection. Finally, we assess the ongoing institution building for CMIP in Europe. While we focus on the European experience, our discussion on designing institutions carries forward lessons for CMIP in other regions, too.
The interpretation of “disputes concerning military activities” under Article 298(1)(b) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) rests on a sensitive balance between the protection of strategic interests of States and the need for peaceful settlement of international disputes. There, an essential issue arises how an adjudicative body acting under Part XV UNCLOS should assess the nature of conducts of State for the purposes of Article 298(1)(b). This issue was vividly raised in the dispute between Ukraine and the Russian Federation with regard to the detention of Ukrainian naval vessels and servicemen. In this regard, both the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the arbitral tribunal set out in accordance with Annex VII UNCLOS wrestled with this issue. This article examines the manner of the interpretation of the concept of the military activities for the purposes of Article 298(1)(b) by comparing the approaches taken by ITLOS and the Annex VII arbitral tribunal.