Critical maritime infrastructure protection has become a priority in ocean governance, particularly in Europe. Increased geopolitical tensions, regional conflicts, and the Nord Stream pipeline attacks in the Baltic Sea of September 2022 have been the main catalysts for this development. Calls for enhancing critical maritime infrastructure protection have multiplied, yet, what this implies in practice is less clear. This is partially a question of engineering and risk analysis. It also concerns how the multitude of actors involved can act concertedly. Dialogue, information sharing, and coordination are required, but there is a lack of discussion about which institutional set ups would lend themselves. In this article, we argue that the maritime counter-piracy operations off Somalia, as well as maritime cybersecurity governance hold valuable lessons to provide new answers for the institutional question in the critical maritime infrastructure protection agenda. We start by clarifying what is at stake in the CMIP agenda and why it is a major contemporary governance challenge. We then examine and assess the instruments found in maritime counter-piracy and maritime cybersecurity governance, including why and how they provide effective solutions for enhancing critical maritime infrastructure protection. Finally, we assess the ongoing institution building for CMIP in Europe. While we focus on the European experience, our discussion on designing institutions carries forward lessons for CMIP in other regions, too.
Offshore energy hubs connect large amounts of offshore wind to a hub from where the generation can be transmitted to onshore, potentially linking to multiple surrounding countries. The benefits of such hubs, and the related meshed offshore grid to connect them, have been investigated in the North Sea. The system-wide impacts of offshore energy hubs in the Baltic Sea are less studied; however, the region is seeing increased interest in offshore wind development. This paper uses detailed offshore wind generation simulations and energy system optimisation to investigate the cost-effectiveness of offshore energy hubs in the Baltic Sea in different scenarios towards 2050. The results show that the largest deployment of offshore energy hubs occurs when the energy system is highly electrified. The strongest development of the offshore energy hubs occurs in the southern part of the Baltic Sea.
The cybersecurity landscape is evolving, driven by a reinforcing feedback loop of increasingly sophisticated attacks and defences. Threat actors, long benefitting from the asymmetrical “attacker’s advantage” of focused targeting, have now matured their organizational structures to facilitate tactical information sharing, technique specialization, the establishment of markets for buying and selling exploit and vulnerability information, and providing training on how to circumvent detection and defence systems.
The report is organized as follows. The introduction will lay out the current state-of-play of eco-efficiency and the zeitgeist of the current situation on maritime that we find ourselves in, in 2020. The next section will provide some historical context looking back to 2010 and 2000 to trace the trajectory and developmental course on which we are. The core contribution of this report is the Maritime Operations Roadmap that can be found in Figure 1 on page 9. This illustration plots the expectations for technological capabilities and policy from 2020 to 2030.
The report is organized as follows. The introduction will lay out the current state-of-play of eco-efficiency and the zeitgeist of the current situation on maritime that we find ourselves in, in 2020. The next section will provide some historical context looking back to 2010 and 2000 to trace the trajectory and developmental course that we are on. The core contribution of this report is the Shipyard 4.0 Roadmap, that can be found in Figure 1 on page 9. This illustration plots the expectations for technological capabilities and policy from 2020 to 2030. The descriptions of the elements of the roadmap are provided in Appendix 1.
The activities and emissions from leisure boats in the Baltic Sea have been modeled in a comprehensive approach for the first time, using a new simulation model leisure Boat Emissions and Activities siMulator (BEAM). The model utilizes survey data to characterize the national leisure boat fleets. Leisure boats have been categorized based on their size, use and engine specifications, and for these subcategories emission factors for NOx, PM2.5, CO, non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOCs), and releases of copper (Cu) and zinc (Zn) from antifouling paints have been estimated according to literature values. The modeling approach also considers the temporal and spatial distribution of leisure boat activities, which are applied to each simulated leisure boat separately. According to our results the CO and NMVOC emissions from leisure boats, as well as Cu and Zn released from antifouling paints, are significant when compared against the emissions originating from registered commercial shipping in the Baltic Sea. CO emissions equal 70 % of the registered shipping emissions and NMVOC emissions equal 160 % when compared against the modeled results in the Baltic Sea in 2014. Modeled NOx and PM2.5 from the leisure boats are less significant compared to the registered shipping emissions. The emissions from leisure boats are concentrated in the summer months of June, July and August and are released in the vicinity of inhabited coastal areas. Given the large emission estimates for leisure boats, this commonly overlooked source of emissions should be further investigated in greater detail.