Critical maritime infrastructure protection has become a priority in ocean governance, particularly in Europe. Increased geopolitical tensions, regional conflicts, and the Nord Stream pipeline attacks in the Baltic Sea of September 2022 have been the main catalysts for this development. Calls for enhancing critical maritime infrastructure protection have multiplied, yet, what this implies in practice is less clear. This is partially a question of engineering and risk analysis. It also concerns how the multitude of actors involved can act concertedly. Dialogue, information sharing, and coordination are required, but there is a lack of discussion about which institutional set ups would lend themselves. In this article, we argue that the maritime counter-piracy operations off Somalia, as well as maritime cybersecurity governance hold valuable lessons to provide new answers for the institutional question in the critical maritime infrastructure protection agenda. We start by clarifying what is at stake in the CMIP agenda and why it is a major contemporary governance challenge. We then examine and assess the instruments found in maritime counter-piracy and maritime cybersecurity governance, including why and how they provide effective solutions for enhancing critical maritime infrastructure protection. Finally, we assess the ongoing institution building for CMIP in Europe. While we focus on the European experience, our discussion on designing institutions carries forward lessons for CMIP in other regions, too.
Why should we look to the past to understand privacy and the ways we can protect it? Privacy, as a contemporary concept, already seems to be challenging to define and regulate enough. With the ever-speeding technological developments we face today, it is hard to catch up with all the different ways in which our privacy can be breached. In the case of the maritime context, the complexity increases. Issues of jurisdiction, as well as the maritime control of the mobility of goods, information, and people, make tackling ‘privacy at sea’ a difficult task. Regulating forces, such as the European Maritime Safety Agency, need to be clear on their security measures, which must include a balance between surveillance for safety and personal data protection on the one hand and general privacy for people in vessels on the other.1 Looking back to history could, therefore, appear counterproductive, adding intricacies to an already convoluted issue. However, shifting perspectives to understand the historical roots of how such issues developed and to pay heed to what people continuously try to protect when advocating for privacy helps us break those dichotomies that make the balance between public safety and privacy harder to reach.
The agenda of objectual International Relations has shown why object matters, how they arise and with what effects. Far less attention has been paid to how objects are maintained and stabilized over time and how their coherence is achieved. To add this dimension to the debate, we suggest turning to the infrastructures of object maintenance. Infrastructures are social material arrangements that maintain objects and enable their use. We introduce a framework for the study of object infrastructures and illustrate it by drawing on the case of "maritime piracy". Providing a historical reconstruction of the infrastructures that produce piracy as an international object, we show that the growing proliferation of these infrastructures does not lead to an internal coherence of the object over time, but rather objectual fracturing and instability. We reveal how objects are often multiple rather than unitary. The article adds an important new dimension to the study of objects in International Relations.
Offshore wind energy production has seen a significant expansion in recent years. With technologies rapidly improving and prices dropping, it is now one of the key instruments in the green energy transition. The implications of offshore wind farm expansion for maritime security and ocean governance have, so far, received sparse attention in the literature. This article offers one of the first thorough analyses of the security of offshore wind farms and related installations, such as underwater electricity cables, energy islands, and hydrogen plants. The technical vulnerabilities of wind farm systems is reviewed and threats from terrorism, crime and State hostilities, including physical and cyber risk scenarios, are discussed. The expansion of green offshore energy production must keep pace with the changing threat landscape that follows from it. Prospective solutions for the protection of wind farms systems, including surveillance, patrols and self-protection are discussed. The current repertoire of maritime security solutions is in many ways capable of dealing with the threats and risks effectively if adjusted accordingly. The analysis builds important new bridges between debates in energy security and maritime security, as well as the implications of climate change adaption and mitigation for security at sea.
Illicit maritime activities generate significant scholarly and policy attention. While diverse in nature, governance responses share many regulatory features. This introduction advances the notion of maritime justice, a socio‐legal research agenda. Different from broader maritime security studies, it places law at the centre of the inquiry, studying maritime governance practices through the lens of regulation. Empirically, it covers operational, spatial, and structural junctions between illicit maritime activity and regulatory responses deriving from international and domestic law. Analytically, it is heterogeneous but holds a methodological commitment to studying everyday law enforcement practices of maritime security governance to disentangle its meanings and effects. The introduction posits the junction between illicit maritime activities and regulatory responses as a productive space to study the varied norms that shape order‐making at sea, and vice versa.
Offshore wind energy production has seen a significant expansion in the past decade and has become one of the most important maritime activities. However, the implications of offshore wind farm expansion for maritime security have, so far, received sparse attention in the literature. In this article we conduct one of the first thorough analyses of the security of offshore wind farms and related installations, such as underwater electricity cables, energy islands, and hydrogen plants.
The European Union (EU) seeks to become a global maritime-security actor, yet strategic challenges influence its maritime-security strategy process. Is there a distinctive and coherent EU approach to global maritime security, and how should the EU address the growing range of maritime challenges, including the intensification of militarized competition in the Indo-Pacific?
The protection of critical maritime infrastructures has become a top political priority, since the September 2022 attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea. This contribution reveals why the protection of infrastructures at sea is a difficult task. Reviewing the spectrum of maritime infrastructures (transport, energy, data, fishing, ecosystems) and the potential threats to them (accidents, terrorism, blue crime, grey zone tactics) demonstrates that designating infrastructures as critical and worthy of special protection measures is a political choice. The analysis moreover shows the need of protective instruments that are tailored to the specificities of maritime space, and the need for integrating diverse policy fields, including defense, diplomacy, marine safety, maritime security and cyber security. Cooperation with the infrastructure industry, enhanced surveillance and investments in repair capacities are also required.
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has for four decades been considered by many to be one of the most important legislative achievements of international law. It is revered as a “constitution of the oceans”, providing the legal framework for the governance of the oceans. This volume explores how the UNCLOS is functioning in various complex settings, how it adapts to new, emerging developments, as well as how it interacts with other regulations, both within the law of the sea regime and outside. Engaging in themes such as law and order at sea, UNCLOS' interaction with human rights and the role of private actors, the book raises complex questions in the application, understanding, and enforcement of the convention and how it can be envisaged, interpreted, and used in a dynamic world. The volume also raises methodological questions, the answers to which may enhance the predictability and coherence of the law under UNCLOS and thus secure its role as the predominant and relevant system for legal governance at sea for many decades to come. As a contribution to ensuring the future relevance of UNCLOS, the book will be a valuable resource for scholars, diplomats, judges and other practitioners who are working with and interpreting the law of the sea and related issues of maritime law, migration law, human rights law and humanitarian law.
The core function of UNCLOS is to provide a legal order for the oceans and their peaceful uses. This includes providing a legal framework for upholding law and order at sea, as this is a precondition for peaceful use. Part One of this volume deals with different perspectives of upholding law and order at sea; and Chapter 2 creates a backdrop for the following chapters dealing with these various issues. The chapter presents some perspectives on the system of law and order at sea and sets the following chapters in context with themes such as the scope of UNCLOS and its limitations, the adaptability of the convention to new developments, the role of the zonal system created under the convention and the influence of state practice on the system of upholding law and order at sea. By doing so, Chapter 2 also creates a line to the following parts of this volume; and some of the perspectives raised in Chapter 2 will be revisited in the final part (Part Four) of this volume, dealing with UNCLOS as a system of regulation and connected methodologies.