The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is rooted in the Treaty of Rome. After its completion in 1983, the policy framework was gradually reformed through decennial reviews in 1993, 2003, and 2014. Due to geopolitical, physiographic, and historical reasons, the EU implementation of the CFP is most developed in the North Atlantic Ocean, the North Sea, and the Baltic Sea, and less developed in the Mediterranean and Black Sea. However, the CFP applies throughout European Union (EU) waters, which that are treated as a “common pond.” The CFP has been heavily contested since its introduction, and over long periods was characterized as a management system in crisis. Historically, the CFP has arguably struggled to perform and the policy’s ability to meet its objectives has not uncommonly been undermined by factors such as internally contradictory decisions and inefficient implementation. Since the turn of the century, the policy has changed its course by incrementally institutionalizing principles for a more environmentally orientated and scientifically based fisheries management approach. In general, in the latest decade, fisheries have become increasingly sustainable in both environmental and economic terms. An increasing number of fish stocks under the CFP are being exploited at sustainable levels—a development that is likely to continue, as fish stocks are coming to be more commonly managed along the lines of science-based multi-annual management plans. Consequently, many fishing fleets, particularly those deployed in northern waters, have shown good economic performance in recent years. This development has been further facilitated by the introduction of market-based management principles; in most member states these have been implemented by granting de facto ownership to fishing rights for free in the name of ecological and economic sustainability. This has, however, in many cases also led to huge wealth generation for a small privileged group of large-scale fishers at the expense of small-scale fisheries and smaller fishing communities, as well as society at large; this situation has led to calls for both a fairer distribution of fishing rights—to protect the small-scale sector—and for a resource rent or exploitation fee to be collected for the benefit of society at large, which is the true owner of fishing resources. Consequently, social sustainability, understood as the improved well-being of fishing communities and a fairer sharing out of the benefits derived from fisheries resources, should be a subject for the CFP to consider in the future.
The profile of small-scale fisheries has been raised through a dedicated target within the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG14b) that calls for the provision of 'access of small-scale artisanal fishermen to marine resources and markets'. By focusing on access to fisheries resources in the context of the European Union, in this article we demonstrate that the potential for small-scale fishing sectors to benefit from fishing opportunities remains low due to different mechanisms at play including legislative gaps in the Common Fisheries Policy, and long-existing local structures somewhat favoring the status quo of distributive injustice. Consequently, those without access to capital and authority are faced by marginalizing allocation systems, impacting the overall resilience of fishing communities. Achieving SDG14b requires an overhaul in the promulgation of policies emanating from the present nested governance systems.
Any ecosystem based fisheries management system is necessarily faced with the problem of multiple objectives that trade-off against one another. Typically, objectives such as the maximization of yield, employment or profit or minimizing environmental impacts will be optimized in different parts of the decision space, which is formed of the fishing mortality rates that can be applied to the various species, given the constraints imposed by the mixed species nature of many fishing fleets. Since objectives cannot be simultaneously achieved, managers need to consider how such objectives trade-off against one another in order to choose a balanced strategy. Normally, they also have to consider the views of different groupings of stakeholders, who often favour widely different and conflicting objectives. This is particularly difficult if stakeholders are reluctant to expose their negotiating positions. This article explores two possible approaches to developing a Decision Support Framework for the North Sea. The first is a classic Multi- Criteria Analysis (MCA) approach that was developed in cooperation with North Sea stakeholders. The implementation went smoothly for the definition of suitable scenarios, decision trees and criteria, but failed in facilitating consensus on how to set priorities at the stakeholder level. However, it remains a possible approach for higher level management to adopt. Consequently, to aid effective decision-making a simpler approach was designed to visualise stakeholders concerns both to themselves and to the managers in charge of actual decision-making. Rather than trying to achieve some joint optima of the objectives that stakeholders wish to achieve this approach seeks to avoid the solutions various stakeholder groups resent the most. This ‘N dimensional potato approach’ proposed here treats the decision space as analogous to a partially rotten potato that has to be prepared for the table: each group of stakeholders cut away those parts of the decision space that they consider unacceptable. Ideally, this would leave a decision space where somewhat acceptable compromise solutions exist. But, if no decision space is left after all have made their cuts, this approach will still inform managers about the consequences of different solutions in terms of which group will be disappointed and by how much. Making this approach operational requires both uncovering various stakeholders’ views of the unacceptable areas, and also displaying these areas in a convenient fashion together with areas of stakeholder consent. The article describes the steps taken to address these two tasks by the North Sea case study of the MareFrame research project.
Rigid fisheries management frameworks often leave fishermen with limited possibilities and incentives to adjust the selectivity of their gears to the specific fishing conditions. Implementation of the landing obligation in European fisheries emphasizes fishermen's need for flexibility in which gear to use to be able to match the selectivity of the gear to the quota available. How fishermen can play an important role in facilitating a more regionalised and flexible technical regulation by actively participating in the development of gears and contributing to the scientific documentation of their selectivity is discussed. Perspectives in the proposed technical regulation for EU fisheries and the regionalization in the 2013 Common Fisheries Policy are discussed based on an analysis of the current EU technical regulation. Then a new pathway to address the problem, currently being trialled in Danish fisheries, is discussed. Throughout the article, three themes are discussed: Identifying gear needs, development and testing of gear with fishermen as central actors; how the selectivity of the gear should be documented; and opportunities for faster evaluation of new gear, following the regionalization of the technical measure regulation. The paper concludes that a more flexible system of gear development and evaluation is possible by a) involvement of fishermen in proposing gear adjustments, self-sampling and documenting results following scientific protocols and evaluation, testing a range of designs before scientific testing, and b) open for faster approval of gear use under a regionalized technical regulation regime with annual adjustments of management plans containing the technical regulation.
The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) occupies a central role in the advice system to support the implementation of an ecosystem approach to fisheries management (EAFM) in the European Union (EU). Despite improvements, its capacity to deliver ecosystem advice seems to be far from a fully functional operational framework. To what extent availability of appropriate scientific advice is a barrier for a more widespread use of an EAFM in Europe remains an open question. Building on the findings of a large research project, this article explores what advice ICES can provide. The article concludes that: (i) ICES has taken a leading role in generating an EAFM framework in which management decisions can operate; (ii) the advice “suppliers” and the advice “users” agree on the feasibility of using existing knowledge to “do EAFM now”; (iii) ICES can address a range of shortcomings, but some of the present bottlenecks demand concerted action between the advisory system and the political realm. The implementation of an EAFM requires consistency between science and management. ICES appears as well-suited to facilitate the dialogue on applying an EAFM in the EU, but it is unrealistic to expect ICES to produce all the answers.
The European fisheries management is currently undergoing a fundamental change in the handling of catches of commercial fisheries with the implementation of the 2013 Common Fisheries Policy. One of the main objectives of the policy is to end the practice of discarding in the EU by 2019. However, for such changes to be successful, it is vital to ensure stakeholders acceptance, and it is prudent to consider possible means to verify compliance with the new regulation. Remote Electronic Monitoring (REM) with Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) has been tested in a variety of fisheries worldwide for different purposes and is currently considered as one possible tool to ensure compliance with a European ban on discards.
This study focuses on Danish fishery inspectors and on fishers with REM experience, whose opinions are less well known. Their views on the landing obligation and on the use of REM were investigated using interviews and questionnaires, and contrasted to some fishers without REM experience. 80% of fishery inspectors and 58% of REM-experienced fishers expressed positive views on REM. 9 out of 10 interviewed fishers without REM experience were against REM. Participation in a REM trial has not led to antipathy towards REM. Fishery inspectors saw on-board observers, at-sea control and REM as the three best solutions to control the landing obligation but shared the general belief that the landing obligation cannot be enforced properly and will be difficult for fishers to comply with. The strengths and weaknesses of REM in this context are discussed.
There is an increasing pressure on the fisheries to avoid bycatch and discards. In the EU this is seen in landing obligations in the new Common Fisheries Policy. The European fisheries are thus under pressure to be highly selective both in adjusting catches to the individual or collective quota combinations and to be size selective in order to optimize the economic outcome of the available quota. This paper proposes a strategy of time-place selectivity by sharing real-time data and information between vessels about areas with high abundance of unwanted species and sizes (hotspots). The paper examines use of time-place regulation, risks/benefits of sharing knowledge and experiences from a previous real-time information sharing system as a basis for developing the four models for fisher's sharing of information. The models differ with respect to data and information collection methods, who owns and accesses the data and hotspot warnings. The models are tested through a discussion of the possible application of the models in the context of the nephrops trawl fishery in Kattegat and Skagerrak. Based on this the models are proposed as possible tools for the fishing industry and managers when adjusted to specific local conditions, and a recommendation for policy support of development of information sharing systems is outlined.
This study compares the details and performance of fisheries management between the EU and a selection of other countries worldwide: Iceland, New Zealand, and Australia, which are considered in many respects to be among the most advanced in the world in fisheries management. Fisheries management in the EU, Iceland, Australia, and New Zealand has developed following different paths, despite being based on similar instruments and principles. Iceland, Australia, and New Zealand have been at the forefront of developing management practices such as stakeholder involvement, legally binding management targets (Australia, New Zealand), individual transferable quotas, and discard bans (Iceland, New Zealand). The EU has since the beginning of the 21st century taken significant steps to better involve stakeholders and establish quantitative targets through management plans, and a landing obligation is gradually being implemented from 2015 onwards. The management of domestic fisheries resources in Australia, New Zealand, and Iceland has, overall, performed better than in the EU, in terms of conservation and economic efficiency. It should, however, be stressed that, compared to Australia, New Zealand, and Iceland, (i) initial over‐capacity was more of an issue in the EU when management measures became legally binding and also that (ii) the EU has been progressive in developing common enforcement standards, on stocks shared by sovereign nations. The situation of EU fisheries has substantially improved over the period 2004–2013 in the northeast Atlantic, with fishery status getting close to that in the other jurisdictions, but the lack of recovery for Mediterranean fish stocks remains a concern.
In this report, the PrimeFish project provides an overview of the European and especially the EU seafood sector in the context of global development; i.e. development in other continents with a focus on large commodity groups for fisheries and aquaculture.
A number of solutions, with varying efficiency, have been proposed to mitigate discards. In this paper twelve mitigation measures were reviewed by their strengths and weaknesses, along with opportunities and threats, they might entail. How mitigation methods could either support or counteract others was also reviewed. The analyses of the mitigation measures are based on expert knowledge and experience and supported with existing literature. Discarding is highly variable and is influenced by numerous biological, technical and operational factors as well as social and economic drivers. These influences need to be carefully considered when designing management approaches. Finally, all reforms must be carefully considered within the context of a broader management system. The full management system needs to be thought of coherently to create an incentive framework that motivates fishers to avoid unwanted catches. It is only in this setting that discard mitigation methods may be potentially effective.