The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is rooted in the Treaty of Rome. After its completion in 1983, the policy framework was gradually reformed through decennial reviews in 1993, 2003, and 2014. Due to geopolitical, physiographic, and historical reasons, the EU implementation of the CFP is most developed in the North Atlantic Ocean, the North Sea, and the Baltic Sea, and less developed in the Mediterranean and Black Sea. However, the CFP applies throughout European Union (EU) waters, which that are treated as a “common pond.” The CFP has been heavily contested since its introduction, and over long periods was characterized as a management system in crisis. Historically, the CFP has arguably struggled to perform and the policy’s ability to meet its objectives has not uncommonly been undermined by factors such as internally contradictory decisions and inefficient implementation. Since the turn of the century, the policy has changed its course by incrementally institutionalizing principles for a more environmentally orientated and scientifically based fisheries management approach. In general, in the latest decade, fisheries have become increasingly sustainable in both environmental and economic terms. An increasing number of fish stocks under the CFP are being exploited at sustainable levels—a development that is likely to continue, as fish stocks are coming to be more commonly managed along the lines of science-based multi-annual management plans. Consequently, many fishing fleets, particularly those deployed in northern waters, have shown good economic performance in recent years. This development has been further facilitated by the introduction of market-based management principles; in most member states these have been implemented by granting de facto ownership to fishing rights for free in the name of ecological and economic sustainability. This has, however, in many cases also led to huge wealth generation for a small privileged group of large-scale fishers at the expense of small-scale fisheries and smaller fishing communities, as well as society at large; this situation has led to calls for both a fairer distribution of fishing rights—to protect the small-scale sector—and for a resource rent or exploitation fee to be collected for the benefit of society at large, which is the true owner of fishing resources. Consequently, social sustainability, understood as the improved well-being of fishing communities and a fairer sharing out of the benefits derived from fisheries resources, should be a subject for the CFP to consider in the future.
The profile of small-scale fisheries has been raised through a dedicated target within the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG14b) that calls for the provision of 'access of small-scale artisanal fishermen to marine resources and markets'. By focusing on access to fisheries resources in the context of the European Union, in this article we demonstrate that the potential for small-scale fishing sectors to benefit from fishing opportunities remains low due to different mechanisms at play including legislative gaps in the Common Fisheries Policy, and long-existing local structures somewhat favoring the status quo of distributive injustice. Consequently, those without access to capital and authority are faced by marginalizing allocation systems, impacting the overall resilience of fishing communities. Achieving SDG14b requires an overhaul in the promulgation of policies emanating from the present nested governance systems.
This study compares the details and performance of fisheries management between the EU and a selection of other countries worldwide: Iceland, New Zealand, and Australia, which are considered in many respects to be among the most advanced in the world in fisheries management. Fisheries management in the EU, Iceland, Australia, and New Zealand has developed following different paths, despite being based on similar instruments and principles. Iceland, Australia, and New Zealand have been at the forefront of developing management practices such as stakeholder involvement, legally binding management targets (Australia, New Zealand), individual transferable quotas, and discard bans (Iceland, New Zealand). The EU has since the beginning of the 21st century taken significant steps to better involve stakeholders and establish quantitative targets through management plans, and a landing obligation is gradually being implemented from 2015 onwards. The management of domestic fisheries resources in Australia, New Zealand, and Iceland has, overall, performed better than in the EU, in terms of conservation and economic efficiency. It should, however, be stressed that, compared to Australia, New Zealand, and Iceland, (i) initial over‐capacity was more of an issue in the EU when management measures became legally binding and also that (ii) the EU has been progressive in developing common enforcement standards, on stocks shared by sovereign nations. The situation of EU fisheries has substantially improved over the period 2004–2013 in the northeast Atlantic, with fishery status getting close to that in the other jurisdictions, but the lack of recovery for Mediterranean fish stocks remains a concern.