The problem of marine litter represents a significant global challenge and illustrates the harmful consequences of an economic model that is based on disposability. The seafood sector is not only among the culprits, but is also among the most affected by this threat to the marine environment. Earlier research has pointed to fishing gear take-back schemes as a measure to mitigate the problem, and policymakers have embraced the idea. The Norwegian scheme for beverage containers has been hailed as a benchmark for the application of Extended Producer Responsibility. Through the lens of business ecosystems, we draw parallels between the existing take-back scheme for beverage containers and the latent system for fishing gear to answer the question: “What would it take to establish a take-back scheme for fishing gear?” We elaborate upon four factors that are well established for beverage container take-back schemes, but lacking or unclear in the case of fishing gear: (i) politico-institutional support, (ii) the system's value proposition, (iii) the system integrator, and (iv) operational factors (i.e., a network of collection points and procedures, and material variety and complexity). Our findings highlight that when innovations are not based on the usual market mechanisms, unconventional conceptualizations of value itself and how value is mapped and distributed are required. Meaningful engagement of the private sector depends upon either explicit articulation of value capture or policy instruments to enforce responsibility; both are currently either unclear or lacking in the context of fishing gear.
In 2020, the Danish Ministry of Environment and Food launched a new state-led ecolabelling scheme for fish originating from small-scale, 'low-environmental-impact' fisheries; "Nature-friendly". The label was introduced to a domestic market where the vast majority of the fish landed by Danish vessels was already certified by the global leader in certification of (wild caught) fish products, the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). MSC's high market penetration created a situation where especially small-scale fishermen felt that MSC certification had developed into a market norm without providing fishermen the benefits of demonstrating extraordinarily sustainable practices and thereby gaining competitive advantages. Rather, MSC's market penetration was perceived as undermining efforts to brand and market fish originating from small-scale fisheries as particularly sustainable. This article explores the processes that led up to the NaturSkånsom labeling scheme by applying a 'power in planning and policy framework' as an analytical lens. Through the NaturSkånsom process, the article investigates what happens when an ecolabel becomes a market norm, how small-scale fisheries actors who feel disadvantaged by such a development and environmental organizations form alliances, mobilize support and multiple resources to strengthen their positions in the political settings. The examination of this case highlights how stakeholders traditionally thought of as less resourceful can gain political influence. The article offers a glimpse into a possible, emerging future where those who perceive themselves as the most sustainable producers may increasingly view large and dominating ecolabels simultaneously as obstacles and forces for positive change.
This article investigates recent reforms of the Greenland coastal fisheries in order to contribute to the general lessons on reform and policy networks in the context of a changing Arctic stakeholdership. It analyzes participation in fisheries governance decision-making by examining the emergence of discourses and policy networks that come to define the very need for reform. A policy network is identified across state ministries, powerful officials, banks and large scale industry that defined the need for fisheries reform within a 'grand reform' discourse. But inertia characterized the actual decision-making process as reform according to this 'grand reform' discourse was blocked by a combination of small-scale fishermen' informal networks and the power of the parliamentary majority. After a parliamentary shift in power the new government implemented the 'grand reform' gradually whilst new patterns of participation and exclusion emerged. In this process, the identities of the participating participants were reinterpreted to fit the new patterns of influence and participation. The article argues that fishery reform does not necessarily start with the collective recognition of a problem in marine resource use and a power-neutral process of institutional learning. Instead, it argues that fishery reform is likely to be the 'reform of somebody' and that this 'somebody' is itself a changing identity.