This chapter argues that state-owned Chinese integrated maritime logistics enterprises are about to change the power balance vis-à-vis the hitherto dominant, privately owned enterprises based in Europe. This shift, which has been actively supported as part of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, will directly affect the European Union’s common transport and competition policy. Within the larger Belt and Road Initiative, the Maritime Silk Road project can be seen as the umbrella concept for the comprehensive management of the entire supply chain between China and Europe. We discuss possible policy implications for both China and the European Union when it comes to managing the subtle balance between geopolitical considerations and efficient operations of trade and transport controlled by a few dominant actors. As part of our theoretical framework, we use two extensions of the classical obsolescing bargaining model: the one-tier bargaining model and a bargaining model of reciprocation. By combining the two models, we aspire to explain the changing nature of bargaining relations between, on the one hand, the Chinese government and its state-owned enterprises and, on the other, the private-owned European companies as a function of the goals, resources and constraints of the involved parties.
The impact of climate change in the Arctic Ocean such as ice melting and ice retreat facilitates natural resources extraction. Arctic fossil fuel becomes the drivers of geopolitical changes in the Arctic Ocean. Climate change facilitates natural resource extractions and increases competition between states and can result in tensions, even military ones. This article investigates through a political and legal analysis the role of China as an emerging regulatory sea power in the Arctic Ocean given its assertive “energy hungry country behaviour” in the Arctic Ocean. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Arctic Council (AC) are taken into consideration under climate change effects, to assess how global legal frameworks and institutions can deal with China’s strategy in the Arctic Ocean. China’s is moving away from its role as “humble power” to one of “informal imperialistic” resulting in substantial impact on the Arctic and Antartic dynamism. Due to ice-melting, an easy access to natural resources, China’s Arctic strategy in the Arctic Ocean has reinforced its military martitime strategy and has profoundly changed its maritime military doctrine shifting from regional to global in the context of UNCLOS. In particular, it is wondered, what China understands about the public order dimension of UNCLOS. The article concludes that despite China’ assertive behaviour towards the Arctic environmental ocean and its rise as global sea power, for the time being, China cannot be considered as a variable for Arctic security as there are no sufficient legal and policy objective elements to adduct that it constitutes a threat to Artic ocean security.