This paper explores the ways in which maritime labor, maritime risk, and seafarers’ survival are embedded in the financial logics and practices of the global shipping industry. By employing the notion of “existential arbitrage,” the ethnography moves through the pursuit of global profit to the value of labor as a commodity, human and financial risk, and ultimately the value of human lives, all of which are arbitraged. Arbitrage is a profit strategy that is based on a belief in the equalizing power of the market yet is predicated on and creates difference among commodities in order to create opportunities to generate profit. Existential arbitrage brings anthropological studies of security and conflict and trade and finance together. By taking the interdependence of these subfields seriously and showing how the relationship between them manifests itself in practice, the notion of existential arbitrage uncovers a brutal financial trading strategy that requires and forces the oscillation between notions of valuable life and the valuation of labor commodities in a competitive global market.
Autonomous marine surface vehicles rely on computer systems with computer intelligence making decisions to assist or replace the navigating officer. A fundamental requirement for the design and implementation of such a cyber-physical system is seamless, predictable, and secure interoperability between vendor-specific hardware and software subsystems. The article describes a system design that includes mechanisms to mitigate the risks and consequences of software defects, individual component malfunction, and harmful cyber interference. It addresses international regulations in the field and demonstrates a system design that can meet the requirements for safe behaviour in foreseeable events while also having the ability to call for human assistance if the autonomous system is unable to handle a situation. The paper presents a design for highly automated vessels with several inherent risk-reducing features, including the ability to isolate and encapsulate abnormal behaviours, built-in features to support resilience to unexpected events, and mechanisms for internal defence against cyber-attacks. The article shows how this is provided by a novel middleware that supports risk mitigation, dependability, and resilience.
Background: Limited access to medical care can be considered as an occupational risk of seafaring and it may predispose to developing community-acquired pneumonia (CAP) requiring hospital care. We sought to investigate the risk for CAP and other lower respiratory tract infections (LRTI) requiring hospital care among seafarers. We examined the length of hospital stay (LOS) as a proxy for severity of illness. Methods: The study population in this panel data analysis were all seafarers and a 20% random sample of economically active individuals aged 18–65 years who were residing in Denmark in 1997–2016, constituting more than 11 million person-years of follow-up. Annually-registered socio-demographic and work characteristics were linked to data on cause of hospital admissions. We used fixed-effects and zero-truncated Poisson regression to estimate the rate ratios of hospitalization for CAP and other LRTI, and compared LOS across the two populations. Results: The adjusted incident rate ratio (IRR) for CAP in seafarers compared to the economically active population was 1.42 (95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.15–1.77), whereas the IRR was 0.73 (95% CI: 0.38–1.42) for other LRTI. For LOS, the IRRs for CAP and other LRTI in seafarers were 1.08 (95% CI: 1.04–1.12) and 0.92 (95% CI: 0.83–1.01), respectively. Conclusions: Our findings indicate that seafaring was associated with an increased risk for CAP requiring hospital care. Limited access to health care may be an important contributing factor.
This follow up paper concerns relational contracts in the maritime industry from a legal, game theoretical, and strategic perspective. The paper discusses the purpose of a relational contract, the specific legal characteristics in a relational contract, and draw up economic explanations of the relations among the clauses in relational contract. Strategy and game theory are used to explain the output of negotiations and explain how to behave if to obtain joint utility in a contractual relationship in the maritime industry.